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LEGAL RIGHTS FOR NATURE - THE
WRONG ANSWER TO THE RIGHT(S)
QUESTION
By P.S. ELDER*
Some years ago, Christopher Stone gave an affirmative answer to
his own question, "Should Trees Have Standing?" 1 He was indepen-
dently supported in this conclusion by Laurence Tribe.2 I must, how-
ever, disagree with him. I reject his claim that non-animal and perhaps
non-living objects ought to have legal standing. The only stone which
could be of moral concern and hence deserving of legal rights, is one
like Christopher. This may tell today's "deep ecologist" that "anthro-
pocentric" thinkers such as myself, are "shallow"; but epithets do not
replace analysis.
In this essay, I will highlight the differences between "shallow"
and "deep" ecology, and briefly criticize Stone's position. I will then
claim that Stone and the deep ecologists, even if not philosophically
confused, do not take us anywhere in solving environmental disputes,
that conventional ethics and law do not already go.
I. SHALLOW AND DEEP ECOLOGY
My disagreement with Stone reflects the current debate between
the self-described deep ecologists and their shallow opponents.3 Each
term represents a constellation of views about how humans should re-
late to the natural order. Different camps co-exist under each banner,
but shallow ecologists tend to see moral value only in individual senti-
ent creatures, if not solely in human beings. For this reason, they have
been called "anthropocentric" 4 as opposed to the "ecocentric" views of
* Copyright, 1984, P.S. Elder.
* Professor of Law in Environmental Design, University of Calgary.
1 (1972), 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 450.
2 Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law
(1974), 83 Yale L. J. 1315.
3 Naess, The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement. A Summary (1973),
16 Inquiry 95.
4 "Anthropocentrism" is a somewhat misleading term. First, all environmental ethics are an-
thropocentric in that, as far as we know, they can only be prescribed and consciously followed by
humans. Second, few people believe that only humans are the object of any moral concern
whatever. Almost everybody accords some limited moral significance to those animals who we
think are capable at least of having experience of pain and pleasure.
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deep ecologists. Different proponents in the latter group argue that not
only sentient creatures, but all living things, all species, all ecosystems,
possibly all things in the entire universe have inherent value and have
moral significance independent of their use by human beings, or even of
human existence. They decry the "speciesism" in the claim that human
beings have unique moral importance. They also reject the "sentient-
ism" which claims that some level of consciousness or capacity for ex-
perience is a prerequisite for moral significance. Indeed, some ecologists
have adopted a mystical, ineffable vision of the unity of all:
[It] [t]hen follows the realization that the distinction between 'life' and 'lifeless'
is a human construct. Every atom in this body existed before organic life
emerged. . . . Remember your own childhood as minerals, as lava, as rocks?
... We are the rocks dancing. Why do we look down on them with such a
condescending air?5
Although I have neither the space nor the background to assess the
many arguments for each species of shallow or deep ecology, I note
that Stone is clearly deep and that I am shallow. Also, animal rights
advocates like Tom Regan,6 whose case rests on sentientism, are shal-
low ecologists.
II. STONE'S POSITION
In his article, Stone is "quite seriously proposing that we give legal
rights to forests, oceans, rivers and other so-called 'natural objects' in
the environment - indeed to the natural environment as a whole."7 He
specifically limits himself to "non-animal but natural objects." 8 This
extraordinary leap is based on the following implicit argument. Our
environment is seriously degraded by human action which has been
based upon a serious ethical mistake. We have failed to see that natu-
ral objects, both animate and inanimate, have moral worth in them-
selves. Our anthropocentric ethics value the natural world as a resource
to be manipulated at will for human benefit, without regard for the
rights of non-animate things. On such a view, even conservationists
make anthropocentric utilitarian arguments. Creating rights for these
things and allowing the appointment of guardians to invoke these rights
will enable us to improve the environmental quality. Presumably for
Stone, nothing short of this new "ethical" framework will enable us to
do this.
' Seed, "Anthropocentrism?", in Sessions and Devall, eds., 5 Ecophilosophy (1983) at 11-12.
6 See Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (1983).
7 Supra note 1, at 456.
8 Id. at 26n.
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In discussing the legal implications of his thesis, Stone describes
what it means to be a holder of legal rights: first, no entity has a right
"unless and until some public authoritative body is prepared to give
some amount of review to actions that are colorably inconsistent with
that 'right' "; secondly, "the thing can institute legal actions at its be-
hest"; thirdly, "the court must take injury to it into account" and
fourthly, "relief must run to the benefit of it."9 Naturally, the inani-
mate object could institute proceedings only through its guardian.
Stone does admit that even if trees had rights, they could still be
cut down on certain conditions. Indeed, the environment might have a
different body of rights than humans.10 He believes that an expansion
of environmental impact assessment procedures would be a major step
toward protecting rights of the environment." Beyond procedural pro-
tection, however, Stone suggests that "some [relatively] absolute rights
be defined for the environment by setting up a constitutional list of
'preferred objects.' "12 Proposals threatening injury to them would "be
reviewed with the highest level of scrutiny at all levels of govern-
ment."13 Also, Stone argues that plants can communicate their
"needs"," but does not explain how rocks can do so. He also believes
that economic analysis can quantify loss either on a replacement cost
basis or, in a case that is question-begging, on a normative basis of how
much something should be valued. Payment into a trust fund for the
environment would presumably follow development approval.15
Stone believes that this shift in conceptual framework would work
into the language of judges and steer their thoughts in the right direc-
tion. 6 Perhaps, for example, the burden of proof would be interpreted
"far more liberally from the point of view of the environment."' 7 Stone
even suggests that at the legislative level the natural environment
should perhaps be given some sort of proportional representation.' 8
9 Id. at 458 (emphasis in original).
10 Id.
11 Id. at 483-86.
12 Id. at 486.
12 Id.
14 Id. at 471.
"I Id. at 480.
16 Id. at 488.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 487.
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III. CRITICISM OF STONE
Unfortunately, Stone never reveals why the natural environment
has a moral claim. He argues that, since we have progressed morally
by extending rights to blacks, women and children and even to some
animals that can suffer, we can (and should) progress further by giving
plants and inanimate objects rights.19 But this is obviously a non se-
quitur: people and plants are not in the same category, which would be
necessary to justify such a conclusion. Even if the grass and plants
"need" water, in the sense that they will die without it, why does it
follow that we have a duty to water them? Do they have any moral
importance?
Stone clearly believes they do, and that is the heart of the matter.
But they lack any of the relevant characteristics which make persons of
moral importance - awareness, self-consciousness, the ability to for-
mulate goals, act to attain them and to appreciate their attainment. It
is, therefore, a distortion of our concepts to claim that plants or non-
living natural objects can "want" to survive or remain undisturbed.
There is "nobody home" who could care, or who could suffer. And if
they do not care, why should we? In short, to paraphrase Gertrude
Stein, "When you get there, there's no their there."
Deep ecologists admit that trees and canyons lack the human
characteristics which we all agree make people of moral importance.
They deny, however, that these are the only criteria for an object to
have value in and of itself. Yet, following Kant, does not the notion of
value presuppose a rational conception of self as subject rather than
object? This second order self-awareness or,
[R]eflective capacity of persons. . . makes them the source of value, the objects
of moral concern. The reason that persons are the source of value is that the
choice of an alternative must matter to the chooser; the choice must make the
difference, it must be valued. The idea of a choice being valued is intelligible
only if the choice is consistent with a concept of one's self.20
Stone uses another non sequitur when he argues that, since we can give
rights to fictional entities such as corporations, and can create guardi-
ans for people who cannot speak for themselves, we can do so for the
environment. Maybe we can; certainly these examples have met legal
and individual needs in our complex society. The question, again, is
19 Id. at 450-57.
20 Harper and Stein, "Persons as the Source of Value: An Alternative Basis for Rational
Planning" (paper presented to the Association of Collegaite Schools of Planning, San Francisco
Oct., 1983) at 3.
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why is it morally appropriate to do so? Stone is, remarkably, silent on
the matter.
If it cannot matter to canyon or trees if they are irreparably dam-
aged, how are their guardians to know what to argue on their behalf,
other than by using their own values? Even if trees "want" less smog in
the air, why would they want it? One answer might be to reduce bio-
logical strain and to allow the tree to grow bigger or produce more
seeds. But equally, the tree could ask that other trees competing with it
be cut down for the same reason. Down with survival of the fittest (and
perhaps, implicitly, with wilderness)! Civilized trees, bears or deer
might reasonably ask that they, like people, be protected from the dan-
gers of the natural environment and be fed and watered by people
through the long rigorous winter. As Sagoff comments:
Are labour saving conveniences only good for people? Environmentalists always
assume that the interests of those objects [rivers, mountains, lakes and other
natural things] are opposed to development. How do they know this? Why
wouldn't Mineral King want to host a ski resort, after doing nothing for a billion
years? The seashore . . . indicates its willingness to entertain poor people...
by becoming covered with great quantities of sand.2"
At root, therefore, are the deep ecologists themselves not being
"anthropocentric" in believing they know what is best for the natural
environment? And, what if we disagree about what is best? In the case
of an environment with rights, one can imagine government, industry
and public interest groups litigating to see who will be named as guard-
ian and thus give content to these "rights".
Suppose we agree with Stone that humans are indeed part of the
biosphere and should not be seen as separate and apart. We could draw
a radically different conclusion from his: people are a part of nature,
and in manipulating the environment to their own ends have simply
proven to be better suited for survival. Over the eons of natural
processes, ninety-nine percent of species have already become extinct.
Why may we now not cause other species to become extinct, by being
the stronger competitor? The deep ecologists' answer, one assumes, is
that we owe these species moral duties. Why? Because we're different
and the deep ecologists' case rests on this difference. We are not sim-
ply "part of nature." We can understand morality. Indeed, it is the
essence of being human which leads to respecting the rights of morally
important beings.
21 Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment (1974), 84 Yale L. J. 205 at 222 (words
in brackets supplied).
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IV. ORDINARY ETHICS GETS US THERE TOO
The fundamental question is why moral obligations exist and to-
ward whom. Stone is quite right to point out that we already accept
obligations to other than fully aware human persons - to babies, idiots
and to some extent human vegetables. Who then has rights?
This article is meant only to show that Stone has not made his
case; it is not intended to argue the case for ordinary morality. I would
simply state my conclusion: first, that any self-conscious being who can
have hopes and wishes about the future, weigh alternatives, freely
choose among them and appreciate their attainment, is an object of
moral concern. Second, a creature's capacity to feel pain (not merely
show some physical reactions as plants and styrofoam cups do) clearly
establishes its right not to have unnecessary suffering inflicted even if
the creature is not in the first category. Third, there is no other cate-
gory of morally relevant creatures or things. Thus, if whales, dolphins,
apes or fruit flies can be shown to meet the first test, we cannot murder
them for food or any other purpose nor can we enslave them. On the
other hand, if they can feel pain, but cannot conceptualize (an impossi-
bility to at least one serious thinker22 ) we can kill them for food and
even experiment on them as long as they are not caused to suffer
unduly.
These conclusions may not seem emotionally satisfying. Deep ecol-
ogists may even think such views can be held only by vandals or philis-
tines. This is not so. They need not lead to pillage or to Coney Island.
Many shallow ecologists, including myself, feel peace, delight and awe
when in the wilderness. We also feel great personal distress about the
diminishing wilderness or impending extinction of beautiful animals or
plants. But here are human reasons for us to let them or wilderness
environments, survive - so that many people, shallow or deep, will not
suffer anguish at their disappearance. Thus, rigorous environmental
protection follows from shallow ecology as well as deep. Indeed, of
Arne Naess's seven characteristics of deep ecology, I can support at
least five.23
22 Keeping, Pain (unpublished Master's Thesis, Department of Philosophy, University of Cal-
gary, 1977).
23 Supra note 3. I support the following five of Naess's seven normative principles of deep
ecology (all emphasis in the original):
i. "Rejection of the Man-in-environment image in favour of the relational, total-field
image." (Id. at 95.) Human should not be seen as isolated from, but intrinsic to, the
environment.
2. "Principles of diversity and symbiosis." (Id. at 96.)
3. "Fight against pollution and resource depletion." (Id. at 97.)
4. "Complexity, not complication" (id.), because of the existence of unifying principles
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V. CONVENTIONAL LAW CAN DO IT
Whether or not Stone's murky intuitive claims are philosophically
sound, a great deal of philosophic and legal fuss can be avoided if our
present, conventional legal notions can achieve the same result. Since
all of law is a human construct, it follows that we can identify any
matter of concern and legislate about it, if we want to. Whether or not
non-humans have rights, only humans can be actors in the legal system
and it must follow that only human concerns could ever be addressed
by it. If society has the will to create rights for non-humans, we can a
fortiori use sovereign legislating power to protect the environment by
giving new rights to people.24 A wide range of policy and legal tech-
niques is available within existing legal and moral paradigms. For the
moment, I will ignore the real problem, lack of political will; this exists
whether or not a conceptual or merely technical shift is required.
Stone's main policy thrust seems to be an extension of environ-
mental impact assessment and procedures to ensure a heavier weight-
ing of environmental criteria.25 Clearly, this can be done with our ex-
isting notions. Many suggestions have been made: legislate en-
vironmental criteria which must be considered by decision-makers and
allow court challenges under broader rules of standing for failure to
meet minimum standards of procedure or substance in decision-mak-
ing;26 guarantee the rights to public interest groups or concerned citi-
zens to participate in open hearings with full information and financial
aid to intervenors; extend environmental impact assessment to include
the social and economic environments, and mandate a more searching
which help us to explain ecosystems.
5. Local autonomy and decentralization." (Id. at 98.)
I disagree with:
1. "Biospherical egalitarianism - in principle." (Id. at 95.) Naess believes that the
equal right to live inheres in all living creatures not just humans subject to some rights
of self-defence.
2. "Anti-class posture" (Id. at 96), but only if Naess means to imply that being anti-class
involves a refusal to divide living creatures into those having, and those not having,
moral significance.
24 The "supremacy of Parliament" may be subject to constitutionally protected rights, but if
the constitution interferes with achieving social goals such as rigorous environmental protection,
legal machinery exists which can amend the constitution.
25 Supra note 1, at 482-85.
26 See Elder, "A Survey of Developments in American Environmental Law," in Law Society
of Upper Canada, Pollution Environmental Law Reference Material (rev. ed., 1972) 147 at 149-
50. Stone, supra note 1, at 467 cites one of the same cases, Scenic Hudson Preservation Confer-
ence v. Federal Power Commission, 354 F. 2nd 608 (1965) (sub. nom., Consolidated Edison Co.
of New York Inc. v. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference et al., cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941, 86
S.Ct. 1462 (1966)) to show this is already happening. Curiously he takes developments in the law
of standing as support for his position.
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inquiry of broad alternatives to the proposed project. For instance, de-
cision-makers (and thus public hearing bodies) could be required to
consider evidence that insulation and other energy conservation policies
would be a cheaper "source" of new energy than developing tar sands
or frontier hydrocarbons and in addition, that conservation creates
more employment. 27
Further, the ambit of impact assessment could be extended to both
private and public projects, and even to those which are individually
insignificant if a predicted series of them would, in the aggregate, cause
a significant impact. Programmes or even legislative proposals would
require assessment. 28 Funds for environmental mitigation or reclaima-
tion could be established. Decision makers in all levels of government
involved in this assessment could be required to use legislated criteria,
which presumably Stone would favour. For example, projects having
significant environmental impacts might be authorized only "if no fea-
sible and prudent alternative exists" and "if all possible planning to
minimize harm" has been done. 9
It is widely agreed that our society has failed to protect its citizens
adequately from harm caused by the production or use of many chemi-
cals and from manufacturing processes. Technology assessment might
prevent the production or use of new chemicals or processes until soci-
ety is satisfied that no unreasonable long range human health problems
or environmental damage will occur. Legislatively, a particular burden
and standard of proof could be placed on the proponent of the technol-
ogy; the weight of the burden could be statutorily defined. If scientific
uncertainty and difficulty in the prediction of harm is inevitable,30 de-
velopment may have to be slowed down dramatically. Also, we must
think more carefully about whether limited or pilot approvals should be
considered.
In Canada, for instance, the law of standing has been a potential
barrier in constitutional, public nuisance and administrative law dis-
21 See Elder, Heating Up Cold Lake - Public Participation and Esso Resources' Heavy Oil
Project (Faculty of Environmental Design, The University of Calgary, Occasional Paper Series,
Oct., 1981).
28 Section 102(c) of the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 requires environ-
mental impact statement on "proposals for legislation and other major federal actions. . .. "
29 This was the legislation binding on the U.S. Secretary of Transportation in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814 (1971). See Elder, supra note
26, at 150.
30 See Thompson, "Water Law - The Limits of the Management Concept," in Canadian
Inst. of Resources Law, Environmental Law in the 1980's: A New Beginning Proceedings (1982)
at 45 and Eddy, "Problems in Resolving Scientific Uncertainty Through Legal Process," id. at
131.
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putes. Although the rules, at least in constitutional cases, have been
relaxed, 31 legislation can entirely abolish the standing problem, if this
is thought desirable. Also, lax pollution standards could become more
restrictive. However, sophisticated judgment will be necessary to decide
if the criminp1 law model is satisfactory.32 Possibly effluent fees or re-
gional pollution treatment authorities should be considered. Legislation,
like the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 33 can create a sub-
stantive right for any citizen to sue to prevent significant environmental
harm and even to challenge the adequacy of agency standards. Numer-
ous other techniques are available to the government to shape or even
require or prevent behaviour: income tax deductions or credits; compul-
sory standards (zero pollutant discharge, if deemed feasible); subsidies;
education, training and public information programmes; pilot or dem-
onstration programmes; government procurement requirements; paid
advertising; price setting; and constitutional amendments.
No doubt other more imaginative legal innovations and prescrip-
tions for radical social transformation can and should be developed.
But enough has been said to suggest that the limiting factor in environ-
mental protection is not the paucity of available legal techniques based
on anthropocentric theories of rights. I cannot think of one environmen-
tal protection reform which is beyond present institutional or legal
scope. Of course, this is not to imply that there exists the will to restore
the environment to pristine condition or even that it is necessary to try
to do so. But the debate on this is intelligible and capable of resolution
within our traditional ethics. We do, however, need rigorous public de-
bate about the failure in many spheres of policy to apply traditional
moral principles of justice (rights) and consequentialist goals, such as
maximized happiness or minimized suffering. Stone, Tribe and the
deep ecologists are right when they criticize society for favouring val-
ues which in the long run are wrong, both from a prudential and a
moral point of view. Polluters who fail to internalize their externalities
are really solving their disposal or economic problems at the expense of
others - the paradigm of ignoring people's rights. And rights, properly
understood, include more than protection of property and the physical
person, although again taking these seriously would go far toward solv-
31 Swaigen, Environmental Law 1975-1980 (1980), 12 Ottawa L. Rev. 439 at 459. See this
useful araticle for a discussion of various ideas referred to herein.
31 Thompson, supra note 30.
33 See Sax and Dimento, Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years' Experience Under the
Michigan Environmental Protection Act (1974), 4 Ecology L. Q. 1; Swaigen and Woods, "A
Substantaive Right to Environmental Quality," in Swaigen, ed., Environmental Rights in Canda
(1981) at 195. This collection is fundamental to the area being discussed herein.
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ing our problems. Persons have psychological needs, but ethical policy
formulation can take these into account.
Environmental and social reform require decisions in the political
process, and until the necessary shifts in public attitudes or values oc-
cur, the fundamental direction of our society will continue as it is. Par-
ticipatory decision processes may allow us to argue the case for the
conserver society, social control over production, zero discharge of
highly toxic chemicals, and alternative energy. But, precisely because
the legal techniques await policy decisions, it seems a waste of time for
either Stone or myself to discuss in detail how legal techniques could
help us clean up the environment, if there were the will. There is not.
However, the collective lack of will need not render reformers impo-
tent. Careful analysis and tireless political action are both badly
needed. Ultimately, decision-makers, in appropriate circumstances,
must be persuaded to favour environmental over other interests. Care-
ful ethical analysis will be needed to show the thoughtful ones why they
should. Once sound theory is in place, sophisticated political action will
be needed to show the others why they had better follow such a lead.
But to return to Stone. He is also right to criticize the casual
treatment of the world as a resource, a factory and a dump. It is, first
of all, our home and as it is effectively a closed ecological system (save
for energy from the sun), decision-makers owe us all a moral duty to
respect our rights to "life, liberty and the security of the person."
Our present economic and political systems have failed us. Most
people sense this, even if they cannot articulate it. It is now up to politi-
cal, economic and environmental thinkers to show whether capitalism,
socialism or a third, environmentally based political theory can provide
guidance for the future. Personally, I doubt that a shared perception of
environmental problems and of general prescriptions like decentralized,
small-scale institutions, appropriate technology or the conserver society
can unite people of the left, right and center for very long. Ultimately,
people will still have to choose who will own or control the means of
production and how distribution will occur; "economistic" 3 4 analysis
may not be sufficient, but it is necessary. This is why environmental
political parties like the Green Party35 may be doomed, even though
34 Bookehin, Toward An Ecological Society (1980).
" The Green Party is a well known political faction in Europe, especially in France and
Germany. As well as being environmentalist, its members are deeply democratic (favouring con-
census over majority rule) and tend to believe more in direct action than in Parliamentary repre-
sentation. As well as environmentalism, they support feminism and nuclear disarmament.
The existence of green parties (they are being organized in several provinces in Canada,
including British Columbia, Alberta and Ontario) is a source of frustration to socialists who argue
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they add other issues like feminism and nuclear disarmament to their
programme.
The Canadian mixed economy has tried brilliantly to fuse capital-
ism and socialism. Social welfare programmes and Crown enterprises
have been accepted by private capital as the price for the latter to re-
main fundamentally in control. We can opt for this mixed capitalist
economy with social mobility for the most able, but in a future without
continual growth, the present pattern of distribution will come under
increased pressure. In light of these life and death decisions about toxic
and carcinogenic pollutants, human starvation, oppression and the
threat of nuclear holocaust, deep ecology's argument supporting rights
for canyons, trees and mule deer is really a trivial pursuit. It is not the
direction in which environmental political philosophy should go.
that they have the same programme. However, "Greens" point out that many socialists support
nuclear power, centralized planning and increase material production, all of which are anathema
to many environmentalists.
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